ARIA platform reference
Policy, approvals, and governed actions
ARIA's policy engine checks an agent's action before it happens. Each rule can allow the action, deny it, send it to a human for approval, or log it. If no rule applies, the action is denied.
Availability Included in the ARIA platform license. An administrator enables the policy engine.
Where policy is enforced
ARIA evaluates policy at the points where an agent can cause an effect:
- Before a tool call. The tool does not run until the decision is allow.
- Before each model round. Pre-model gating can stop a run before it spends tokens on a disallowed path.
- Before output is released. Output checks can hold or block a result.
- Inside workflows. Workflow tool steps are governed the same way as agent tool calls.
- For external systems. Agents that run outside ARIA can submit an action for a decision (see Governing agents that run elsewhere).
If the policy service cannot be reached, governance fails closed by default, so an outage does not silently switch enforcement off.
What a rule can say
Rules combine conditions with AND/OR logic and are evaluated by priority.
Conditions
- Comparisons and pattern matches on any field (equals, contains, in a list, greater than, regular expression)
- Which tool or action type is being invoked
- The risk class of the action
- The classification level of the data or mission context
- Data residency
- The number of model iterations already used in the run
- A simple pattern check for personal identifiers in output (SSN-style numbers and email addresses)
- Whether the run has read content flagged as a suspected prompt-injection attempt, and where the content came from (prompt-injection defense is a separate ARIA control)
- Whether a tool's target host is on an allow-list
Decisions
- allow
- The action proceeds.
- deny
- The run stops immediately.
- require approval
- The action waits in a human queue.
- log only
- Recorded, never blocks.
Scopes and revisions
Rules can be scoped to specific agents, workflows, or user roles. A rule that names several scopes applies only where all of them match.
Policy revisions are immutable and each evaluation records a manifest with a SHA-256 hash, so a later review can tell which rules were in force at the time.
Human approvals gated by risk
ARIA assigns each action a risk class: low, medium, high, or critical.
| Risk class | Default handling |
|---|---|
| Low, medium | No approval required |
| High | Approval required, routed to a designated approver role |
| Critical | Approval mandatory, routed to a designated approver role, and cannot be bypassed by turning off human-in-the-loop on the agent |
- Approvals appear in a queue with the requested action and its inputs.
- Approvals that nobody acts on expire, and a background sweep closes the actions waiting behind them.
- Organizations can require separation of duties so the person who requested an action cannot approve it.
- Every approval or rejection is written to the audit log as an authority attestation.
For higher-stakes runs, an optional plan approval step shows a human the exact tool calls and inputs before the first call is made.
Governing agents that run elsewhere
Many organizations run agents built on other frameworks. ARIA offers two ways to put them under the same policy:
An external orchestrator submits an action and receives allow, pending approval, or denied, along with a token to confirm execution afterward.
An MCP-capable agent calls ARIA tools such as policy evaluation, action governance, status polling, and evidence export. ARIA records the decision and the outcome. The agent does the work in its own environment, so ARIA holds the evidence without executing anything itself.
The gateway is enabled by an administrator and uses ARIA API keys with explicit permissions for invoking the gateway and for executing tools. Every gateway call is audited.
Frequently asked questions
What happens if no policy rule matches?
The action is denied by default. Administrators can change this behavior, but the default is the safe one.
Does the policy engine detect prompt injection?
Detection is a separate control: ARIA scans content that agents read and marks the run when something looks like an injection attempt. The policy engine then decides what a marked run may do, for example holding any action that could change something for approval.
Can a human approval be skipped for critical actions?
Not by disabling human-in-the-loop on an agent. Critical-class actions require approval.
Want to walk through a policy set against your environment?
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